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Yu-Sung Su , Yanqin Ruan, Siyu Sun, and Yu-tzung Chang
Abstract:

Past studies on the Chinese internet management system have revealed a smart internet

management system that takes advantage of time to filter content with collective action potential. How and
why such a system was institutionalized? We offer a historical institutional analysis to explain the way in which
the system evolved. We implement social network analysis to examine the Weibo posts of recurrent events,
the elections in Area A in 2016 and 2018, to identify pattern changes in the system. There are two aspects of
the changes: the centralization of the command line to a single authority and the implementation of a
discriminatory strategy to deal with the various online expressions together forming this intelligent system.
The improved Chinese information surveillance system demonstrates both a top-down information
management and a bottom-up opinion formation.
Key words: internet censorship; devolution paradox; pattern recognition; social network analysis
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Introduction
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The intriguing question is how and why such a system
was institutionalized. To address this question, we
propose a pattern recognition framework for detecting
changes in Chinese internet management system.
The framework follows the authors’ design[11] by
introducing a temporal aspect into the analysis to
examine structure changes in the social network of online
discussions of recurrent events. Specifically, we scrape
the microblogging data of similar political events in 2016
and 2018 to formulate a longitudinal social network
analysis. The quasi repeated observations design helps
us to unscramble this complex system of information
management by tracing its conducts along different
time periods while at the same time holding potential
confounding factors invariant.
Using this analytical framework, we are able
to identify significant network structural differences
between 2016 and 2018. The deferral tactic of
information management mentioned in Ref. [11] is
identified in 2018. Additionally, we observe a change
of the information reviewing strategy from a tight
control in 2016 to flexible management in 2018. We
attribute this adjustment to several institutional changes
which were enacted between 2016 and 2018. We find
that similar to other governance issues in China, a
devolution paradox has haunted the way in which
Chinese government manages the online information.
Nevertheless, the adaptive resilience of the regime helps
it to achieve this effective management system through
an evolutionary process[13, 14] . Moreover, we echo others
on the responsiveness of Chinese government[15–18] in
that sometimes the delayed management of information
is a learning process of the government to better respond
to these bottom-up societal pressures. Together, the
Chinese information surveillance system demonstrates
not only top-down information management but also
bottom-up opinion formation (the top-down information
management filters the online expression with a list
of keywords and topics (see Section 2 for details).
The bottom-up opinion formation, on the other hand,
is a strategy for the Chinese government to learn
from the netizens on never-defined or not-well-defined
topics. Henceforth, the government gathers opinions
and information from these online discussions in the
first place and makes subsequent decisions on how to
deal with these. The example topics with this sort are
the LGBT issue discussed in Section 4, or concepts
imported from the West, such as deliberative democracy
and community building/development.).
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
offer an institutional explanation for the evolvement of
the information surveillance system with reference to
official deliberations and regulations. Accordingly, the
system we face today (after 2018) differs greatly from
the previous system (before 2018). Nevertheless, it took
years for the Chinese government to realize that the
old “united front tactic”[19] was essential to managing
this new field of public expression. In Section 3, we
present our research design along with the real time data
collection process between 2016 and 2018 on specific
political events to show the changing patterns of Chinese
internet management. In Section 4, we visually display
the diagrams of social network analysis to show that the
management of internet information is indeed evolving.
We conclude in Section 5.

2

Old Combating Skills Against New Battle
Field

The rapid development of the internet has posed a great
challenge to the information management of the Chinese
government. Internet filtering as well as the firewall
have been used as tools to regulate information flows in
cyberspace. In China, both government authorities and
companies are engaged in internet review. As time goes
on, individuals are trained to self-reviewing their online
expression to cope with the system.
On top of these, the greatest concern for both
the authorities and companies is political risk. The
authorities fear that the availability of too much
unrestrained information to citizens may be detrimental
to the government as well as the regime. Different
departments and agencies in the government are thus
devoted to information control. The companies, on the
other hand, are striking a balance between increasing the
user viscosity by providing opinion friendly cyberspace
and evading administrative penalties for overlooking the
online expressions.
Granted that the internet is a relatively new public
domain, “crossing the river by feeling the stones”
is a rational but inefficient managerial skill to keep
the cyberspace in order. In 2000, a batch of laws
and regulations targeted at managing the internet
were passed, including the “Decision of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Preserving Computer Network Security”, “Regulation
on Internet Information Service”, and “Regulation on
Telecommunications”. A group of departments are
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responsible for overseeing the management of the
internet. These include the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security,
the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio,
Film and Television, and the Ministry of State Security.
A corollary to multiple departments that share with the
same concern and hence the same political responsibility
is a multichannel management (jiu long zhi shui) of
the cyberspace in China. Simply put, no one wants to
be held responsible for unleashing “malicious” views
and ideas on cyberspace. And the way to achieve
this is to get involved in the management to ensure
the departments’ concerns are properly handled. So, a
system of a tight control was a natural product of this
multichannel management.
For example, China’s largest social media platform,
Sina Weibo, was managed by three departments (the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the
Ministry of Public Security, and the State Internet Office)
as well as their subordinate units at the same time.
The byproduct was a naı̈ve system with a blacklist of
keywords that kept expanding over time. As a matter of
fact, the information management system has a simple
if not clearly defined list of nine types of contents
that are forbidden to be produced, copied, published,
or transmitted via the internet[20] . They are listed as
follows:
(1) Against the cardinal principles prescribed in the
constitution.
(2) Detrimental to state security, state secrecy, state
power as well as national unification.
(3) Detrimental to state honor and interests.
(4) Instigating national enmity or discrimination and
breach of national unity.
(5) Breach of state religious policy, propagating
heretical or superstitious ideas.
(6) Disseminating rumors, disrupting social order as
well as stability.
(7) Disseminating obscenity, pornography, force,
brutality, and terror or crime-abetting.
(8) Humiliating, slandering others, and trespassing the
lawful rights and interests of others.
(9) Other contents forbidden by laws and regulations.
The multi-entities and multi-channel management
system forced the Chinese government into a devolution
paradox which held back any potential reform or
improvement to the system. Similar to other public
management issues in China, a devolution paradox refers
to a situation where overly tight control creates gridlock
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and an attempt to loosen it generates chaos (yi guan
jiu si, yi fang jiu luan). Any reform of the system to
relax constraints on certain online expressions would
end up with government authorities and companies
shirking from the responsibility for the management of
information. In other words, there is no reloading once
offloaded. A void of control is thus created. Henceforth,
a reform of the system was not likely to happen if the
devolution paradox was not solved.
The critical juncture in the reform of the system has
to do with an institutional change in 2014. It took
years for the Chinese government to realize that the
key to solve the devolution paradox is to define clearly
who is in charge of the management of internet. Since
2013, the Chinese government has made several public
deliberations calling for a reform on the system. In
2014, the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity
and Informatization was established and attached to the
National Information Office. In the later years, the Office
enacted relevant regulations. Accordingly, companies
revised agreements and regulations with internet users.
Taking Sina Weibo as an example, the Office enacted
the “Provisions on the Administration of Mobile Internet
Applications Information Services” in 2016, which
stated clearly that the Office shall be responsible for the
law enforcement of reviewing and administration of the
information contents of mobile internet apps nationwide.
The agreements and regulations with users of Weibo
were thus revised to reflect this change in January 2017.
The development we depict so far does not show signs
of relaxing the system. Nevertheless, centralizing of the
command line into one authority was institutionalized
and critical to the subsequent reforms.
The reform of the information management system
in the following years has to do with series of speeches
made by Chinese President Xi. In April 19, 2016, Xi
hosted and spoke at a symposium on cybersecurity
and IT applications. In this speech, he claimed that
a sound domain for online opinion expression should
not be only one voice and one tune. Well-intentioned
criticism and public oversight online should be studied
and taken into account, regardless of whether it is
directed at the work of the CCP and government or
at officials personally, and regardless of whether it is
mild-mannered or unpleasant to hear[21] . This was the
first public deliberation from the highest authority since
2000 that proposed a pluralist cyberspace with properly
expressed criticisms.
Later in October 2017, Xi delivered a report to the
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19th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China. In this speech, he reiterated the entreaty to
create a sound cyberspace with better online contents
under a system of improved management. He elaborated
the point by proposing a system of discriminatory
management which provides different treatments for
different contents in this “new battlefield”[22] . This
differential treatment of online information was not a
new invention. In December 2015, Xi made a similar
speech to the National Conference on Party Schools.
He claimed that the cyberspace is a major field of
competition. Borrowing old combat skills to fight in this
new battlefield, Xi divided the battlefield into three areas.
In his words, “The red area is the domain where we have
the initiative and must keep it. The black area is where
we find malicious views in opposition to the Party, so
we must resolutely fight back and reduce their negative
influence. The grey area is an intermediate zone that we
must make an all-out effort to win over and turn into red.”
In other words, the system should endorse the red area,
block the black area, and transform the grey area[23] .
The system has transformed from a passive filtering into
active management of the online information. We have
summarized the historical development of the reform in
Table 1.
In short, we have identified three important changes
Table 1
Year
2000

2014

2015
2016

2017
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in the system. Firstly, the Chinese government has
settled the management of internet into a single authority
since 2014. Secondly, while it permits a pluralist voiced
cyberspace, it has employed a discriminatory strategy to
better administer this public domain. Thirdly, inspectors,
whether they are from the government or companies,
should actively engage into the online discussion to lead
and learn from the contents.
Therefore, based on our review of the evolution of
the system, we should be able to identify the changes
in information management after the aforementioned
institutional changes. In Section 3, we propose a pattern
recognition framework for detecting these changes.

3

A Framework of Pattern Recognition and
Data

We choose recurrent political events, the elections in
Area A, to better identify the pattern change in the
control of the online expression by holding the contents
for discussion as well as the other confounding factors
seemly invariant. The elections in Area A have been a hot
issue for discussion and can attract widespread attention
among Chinese netizens. This issue is also highly
political because the election results set the directions
of the relationship between Mainland China and Area
A in subsequent years. If a pro-China party wins the

Historical institutional analysis of the reform of Chinese internet information management system.

Historical development
Antecedent condition
 A batch of laws and regulations on internet management were passed; a group of departments were enlisted to be responsible
for the management.
 The multi-entities and multi-channel management system led to a devolution paradox that impeded reform of the system
from happening.
Critical juncture
 The Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization was established and attached to the National Information
Office.
 The centralization of the command line of the internet management to a single authority solved the gridlock in the system
and triggered the reform.
Structure persistency
 Xi called for a discriminatory strategy to deal with various internet expressions[21, 22] .
 The National Information Office enacted the “Provisions on the Administration of Mobile Internet Applications Information
Services”, stating clearly the Office shall be responsible for the law enforcement of reviewing and administration of the
information contents nationwide.
 Xi claimed a sound domain for online opinion expression should not be only one voice and one tune[22, 23] .
Reactive sequence
 The governments and companies made changes to the management.
 e.g., Sina Weibo revised the agreements and regulations with users.
Outcome
 An improved system with both a top-down information management and a bottom-up opinion formation was presented.
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election, this will lead to more intensive interactions
between mainland China and Area A. Otherwise, a
stringent and unfriendly relationship will result if a proChina party loses the election. The events fit well to the
three narrative battlefields. The pro-China discussion
is the red field and the expression otherwise is the
black field[23] . Somewhere between these two political
ideologies and preferences is the grey field where the
Chinese government should focus its efforts into content
management. Various surveys have shown that the
majority of Area A themselves are in the middle point
between these two extremes[24] .
In the previous institutional analysis, we conjecture
that changes in the censorship system cannot be plausible
before institutionalization of a clearly defined single

authority in charge of reviewing the conduct of content
management. We analyze two events. They are the
elections held in January 2016 and in November 2018,
respectively. The timing of the two elections is perfect
in the sense that the first election event took place
before Weibo, the largest social media platform in China,
published the revised user agreement in January 2017,
stating the single administration unit is the National
Information Office. To this end, in every minute in
the months of the two elections, we scrapped the
relevant posts from the Weibo to make the following
comparison (see Fig. 1). To make the whole comparison
computational possible, we limit our analysis to a six-day
period, which is three days before and after the elections.
In the end, we have 779 612 posts during January 14–19,

(a) 2016 Weibo posts

(b) 2018 Weibo posts

Fig. 1 Plot of the number of Weibo posts by date. Two spikes were observed near the election day in 2018. The first spike
is about the Film Festival and Awards, which is an awards festival for Chinese language films. The second spike concerns the
election.
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2016 and 349 306 posts during November 22–27, 2018.
We propose a pattern recognition framework to detect
both between and within structural changes using social
network analysis to better identify the adjustment of
the information management system. Firstly, a within
analysis is a comparison of the ebbs and flows of online
discussions of an event, aiming to observe the ways in
which the inspectors inserted their influence before and
after the online discussion of the elections. Secondly, a
between analysis is a comparison of online discussions
of a recurrent event in different years, looking to
see if the network of the public online domain was
indeed metamorphosed before (2016) and after (2018)
the institutional change in the system. We implement
the social network analysis using Gephi 0.9.2[25] and
visualize the network with the Force Atlas 2 layout
algorithm[26] .
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The Force Altas layout algorithm is useful for
displaying large networks like the ones we have in this
study. It pushes apart the most connected nodes with
highest degree from each other and gathers nodes with
lower degrees to these important hubs (nodes). The
iterative plotting algorithm in the end chips away a
hairball-like network into a more revealing and readable
structure, which helps us identify influential nodes and
groups within the network (see Fig. 2). Nevertheless,
large networks like the ones we have in this study are not
readable even after applying a layout algorithm. Hence,
we filter nodes with only one connection after applying
the Force Altas layout algorithm to display the networks.
Additionally, we choose several measures to evaluate
the networks. Firstly, we calculate the degree of a node
to demonstrate how many links it has to other nodes in
the network. The higher degree a node has, the more

(a) January 14-16, 2016

(b) January 17-19, 2016

(c) November 22-24, 2018

(d) November 25-27, 2018

Fig. 2 Plots of the social network analysis. There is a clear pattern change between networks of 2016 (Figs. 2a and 2b) and
networks of 2018 (Figs. 2c and 2d). Nodes with less than 1 degree are masked from the whole network to better reveal the whole
network.
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connected it is, which shows its relative influence to the
network. In Table 2, we list nodes with top 20 highest
degrees in the four periods we analyze.
Secondly, we detect the community structure of
the network with the Blondel’s modularity measure
and partition nodes into different classes. The Blondel
modularity algorithm outperforms other algorithms in
terms of its efficiency and capability of handling larger
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network[27] . Accordingly, if a network’s modularity
is high, it means its community structure is complex,
indicating there is room for plurality and diversity.
According to the institutional analysis in Section 2, we
expect a higher modularity in 2018. The modularity
scores of the four networks are displayed in Table 3.
Thirdly, we juxtapose the modularity with two
other measures: the betweenness centrality measure[28]

Table 2 Lists of nodes of the top 20 degrees in four periods. Ind., Media., and Central. represent individual (personal), local
media, and central media accounts, respectively. The accounts of the top 20 degrees before and after the elections are both
labeled in bold font.
Date
Account type
Degree
Betweenness
Date
Account type
Degree
Betweenness
Ind.01
35 412
105 774
Media.02
35 838
0
Ind.02
28 100
0
Ind.15
27 778
0
Media.01
23 128
442 362
Ind.01
23 443
0
Ind.03
22 670
0
Ind.16
20 766
224 092
Ind.17
20 374
0
Ind.04
19 334
0
Ind.04
18 635
0
Central.01
15 476
0
Ind.05
13 134
28 291
Central.01
13 278
17 508
Ind.18
12 300
0
Ind.06
13 091
37 352 565
Ind.07
12 995
0
Media.01
11 297
78 751
January
January
Central.03
7645
0
Ind.08
10 633
22 906 714
14 – 16,
17 – 19,
Media.03
7553
125 235
Central.02
7598
0
2016
2016
Media.02
6375
0
Ind.19
7429
0
Ind.20
7120
49 776
N/A
4828
0
Ind.09
4616
250 269
Ind.21
7048
0
Ind.22
6333
12 574
Ind.10
4160
0
Ind.23
5273
0
Ind.11
4157
9 445 449
Ind.12
3695
6 574 185
Ind.24
5069
0
Ind.25
4742
31 264
Ind.13
3460
6 351 131
Ind.14
3271
111 463
Ind.26
4633
0
Media.03
3149
8 568 137
Ind.27
4615
9828
Central.04
5296
0
Central.04
7245
0
Media.01
5086
0
Central.05
2795
3549
Central.01
2378
2487
Central.03
3936
0
Central.03
2302
0
Central.01
3440
6116
Central.05
2906
0
Ind.28
2132
0
Media.04
1775
0
Ind.30
2313
0
Media.05
1573
0
Ind.35
2275
0
Media.01
1484
0
Ind.38
2193
0
Ind.29
1326
1208
Ind.39
2024
0
November
November
Ind.30
1316
0
Ind.40
2002
3926
22 – 24,
25 – 27,
Ind.31
1261
0
Ind.31
1939
0
2018
2018
Ind.32
1200
0
Media.07
1836
0
Central.06
1163
0
Media.08
1732
0
Ind.33
1044
0
Central.06
1638
0
Central.07
1029
0
Central.07
1576
0
Media.06
980
0
Media.04
1546
1786
Ind.34
974
1854
Media.09
1471
0
Ind.35
962
0
Ind.41
1355
17 833
Ind.36
851
0
Ind.42
1307
0
Ind.37
847
0
Media.09
1285
0
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Table 3

Modularity, betweenness centrality, and E-I index of the whole networks and the subnetworks in 2016 and 2018.
Number of
Number of
E-I index
E-I index
Date
Modularity
nodes
communities
(whole network)
(between modules)
January 14–16, 2016
378 009
0.655
7231
0.979
–0.444
January 17–19, 2016
401 603
0.695
6771
0.986
–0.503
November 22–24, 2018
71 332
0.863
2065
0.971
–0.756
November 25–27, 2018
124 902
0.837
23 601
0.656
–0.746

implemented in Gephi 0.9.2 and the E-I (ExternalInternal) index[29] implemented in the isnar package[30]
in R[31] . In large networks like the network we analyze
in this study, there is a chance that the high modularity is
a result of many disconnected communities. To address
this issue, we calculate the betweenness centrality, which
measures nodes that are connected to most different
communities together and serve as the hub to these
communities, to capture influential nodes with respect
to the whole network. The E-I index, which measures
the number of ties external to the communities minus
the number of ties that are internal to the community
divided by the total number of ties, is used to capture the
cohesiveness of the communities in a network. We list
the betweenness centrality scores in Table 2 and the E-I
index in Table 3.

4

Result and Finding

The social network analysis on the recurrent event
supports our hypothesis that there are structural changes
which represent shifts in patterns in Chinese information
management system. Visually speaking, the networks
before and after the 2016 election (Figs. 2a and 2b) share
a similar network structure. Some influential nodes with
higher degrees (larger sized dots in the diagrams) are
connected remotely to the dense center. This shows that
these nodes (the opinion leaders), mostly individuals,
played an active role in steering the online discussions
in the 2016 election. Among these nodes of the top 20
degrees, only two were central media, indicating they
have a relatively weak influence over the masses before
and after the 2016 election (see Table 2).
Central media and local media played more significant
roles in 2018 than in 2016. In the lists of nodes of
top 20 degrees in Table 2, 25% of these nodes are
central media and local media in 2016 and 45%–60%
in 2018. This could be a sign of more involvement
from the government in the online discussions in the
2018 election. In contrast, individuals found it hard to
maintain the momentum in both years before and after
the election. Only about one quarter of the individual

nodes managed to keep their importance after the
elections in 2016 and 2018. We find that new individuals
found themselves on the list of the top 20 nodes after
the elections while the majority of the old ones fell
out of the leaderboard. The networks before and after
the 2018 election (Figs. 2c and 2d) demonstrate a clear
shift from a polycentric network to a monocentric one.
On the one hand, a polycentric network in the network
before the 2018 election (Fig. 2c) implies a pluralist
voiced domain was indeed permitted during November
22–24, 2018. The monocentric network after the 2018
election (Fig. 2d) suggests a sign of content filtering
that some contents were trimmed off the network (the
green cluster in Fig. 2c vanished in Fig. 2d). We
identified the contents of these removed posts and
found they are related to the LGBT issue, which was a
prominent issue in the 2018 election (the LGBT issue
is sensitive in China and considered as subverting to
the traditional views [san guan bu zheng]. Nevertheless,
the issue is ambiguous and complicated. In April 15,
2018, the People’s Daily, China’s political propaganda
newspaper, appeared to criticize Sina Weibo for its
over censorship on the LGBT issue by publishing a
commentary emphasizing that it is a personal choice
whether to approve of homosexuality. Clearly, there was
no consensus among internet inspectors on the LGBT
issue in 2018.). Similar to the networks before and
after the 2016 election (Figs. 2a and 2b), the influential
nodes are connected remotely to the dense centers,
indicating a trait of these opinion leaders in dominating
the online discussions on the 2018 election. Nevertheless,
in the network before the 2018 election (Fig. 2c), these
nodes contain central and local media as well as other
important individuals. Comparatively speaking, both
central and local media before and after the 2018 election
demonstrated significant influence over the network.
They were the top nodes with the highest degrees (see
Table 2).
We further examine the differences of network
structures in terms of their subnetwork between 2016
and 2018 by juxtaposing the modularity measure with
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the E-I index (see Table 3). The two modularity scores
of 2018 before and after the election are both higher
than those of 2016. This means that relatively speaking
there were more communities and room for plurality
and diversity in 2018, which supports our conjecture
that the online cyberspace became more multi-voiced as
the Chinese government and the Sina Weibo made the
pledge to formulate such a space in 2017.
The modularity scores we garnered could be illusory
and misleading as we have large networks in analysis.
Hence, we further examine the networks with the
E-I index. In Table 3, the high E-I indices of the
whole networks are close to 1, meaning there is
significant external cohesiveness (more external ties
than internal ties of nodes) of the networks in analysis,
with a minor exception of the one after the election
in 2018. This demonstrates that there are significant
numbers of subgroups that spread over the network
(as listed in the column of number of communities in
Table 3). Nevertheless, we compute the E-I index of
these subgroups (communities), which are partitioned
according to the modularity measures, to explore the
cohesiveness of these subnetworks. The E-I indices of
0.756 and 0.746 in 2018 are higher than the indices
of 0.444 and 0.503 in 2016, indicating there is higher
internal cohesiveness (more internal ties than external
ties of nodes in a subnetwork) in 2018. This means
the nodes of 2018 are highly connected with each other
within different communities in the networks. These
within connections are somewhat weaker in the networks
of 2016. In short, synthesizing the findings based upon
the modularity score and the E-I index, we conclude
more diverse networks and higher cohesiveness within
the subnetworks in 2018.
We further study these communities with the
betweenness centrality measure. The values for the
betweenness centrality measure in Table 2 show quite
significant differences between 2016 and 2018. Firstly,
most nodes with higher degrees in 2016 have high
betweenness centrality. This indicates these nodes are
well connected and these connections are effectively
link communities or groups together. These nodes are
influential across the whole network. Looking at the
betweenness centrality and the E-I index altogether, the
nodes and the communities they belong to are globally
influential in the whole network. The story is different
in 2018. Most nodes with higher degrees do not have
higher betweenness centrality, meaning they are well
connected within the community they belong to, but are
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not well connected to other communities. The internal
cohesiveness of the networks in 2018 is supported by the
E-I index.
So far, our biggest claim is that there is no significant
structural change in 2016 before and after the election,
but the change is quite obvious in 2018. The evolutionary
change from a polycentric network to a monocentric
one we identified between and after the 2016 and
2018 election (Figs. 2c and 2d) is a clear proof for a
structural shift. As a matter of fact, the network before
the 2018 election (Fig. 2c) displays a structural gap
where there is a sparse or blank space between the
green and the yellow clusters (different communities
as computed by modularity measure). We identify
the bridge between these two masses to be ind.29 and
ind.34 with the betweenness centrality measure, which
are also highly influential (high degrees) in the green
mass. They discussed the LGBT issue which is mildly
sensitive topic. The fact that the two posts of these two
accounts were suspended after the 2018 election brings
about the vanishing of the polycentric network and the
dissolving of the community that talked about the LGBT
issues.
The role of individuals was nontrivial in 2016 but less
salient in 2018. One thing in common between 2016
and 2018 is that before and after the elections in the 3
days period in our analysis, the degrees of individuals
and their relative ranking vary significantly. Only a
few individuals were able to maintain a high level of
prominence after the elections. We revisited these nodes
and found that they were either deleted or prohibited
from further commenting and forwarding (e.g., ind.29
and ind.34). This is another sign of content filtering.
Central media and relevant local media were immune
from this filtering. If they were influential before the
elections, they were highly likely to remain influential
after the elections. In short, the content filtering is
selective and targeting with precision.

5

Conclusion

Past studies on Chinese internet management system
have revealed a smart internet management system that
takes advantage of time to filter contents with collective
action potential. Tracing the historical development of
the information management system, we identify the
critical juncture which led to the maturity of the system
we observe today. The centralization of the command
line to a single authority and the implementation of a
discriminatory strategy to deal with the various online
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expressions together formulate this intelligent system.
Theoretically speaking, we enrich the existing studies
with a dynamic analysis. Specifically, we propose a
pattern recognition framework for detecting changes in
the information management system. The framework
calls for a social network analysis on a recurrent political
event across different time (the elections in 2016 and
2018). The structural changes in the networks between
2016 and 2018 are consistent with the institutional
changes in the information management system.
In the essence, the changes involve two seemly
contradictory actions. One is a tightening up action
with a centralization of the management body at the
central government. The other is a relaxing action aiming
to create a multivocal domain. The relevant parties
in this case are responsible for fighting new battles.
Unlike the devolution paradox in the old system, these
two actions work concertedly under the new system.
Based on the evolutionary shift of the networks from
a polycentric network to a monocentric one in 2018,
we suspect that the relaxing action is a way for the
government to learn from the discussions and forge
a consensus on less sensitive issues. Therefore, the
cyberspace discussions sometimes serve as a source
of responsiveness of the government toward citizens
on certain ambiguous topics. By providing restricted
freedom and limited space[14, 32, 33] , the system can offer
a room for this maneuvering without risking the outburst
of certain opinions.
Future studies can trace the role of the official media
with respect to the other online expressions. Scholars
have suggested that Chinese government is deliberately
avoiding actively engaging in online discussions with
netizens[5, 8] . We find that this might not be the case
in 2018 from our social network analysis. The official
media was the primary opinion leader dominating
the discussions in cyberspace in both 2016 and 2018
elections. Nevertheless, it played a more important role
in 2018 than in 2016. A further analysis that pays
special attention to the relationship between the official
media and other netizens can help us better understand
the function of the official media in this virtual public
domain.

Jar-Der Luo, Tiangguang Meng, Shengxiang Ji, Jiangrui
Liu, and conference participants of the 2019 International
Conference of Social Computing at Tsinghua University
for helpful discussions.
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